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DDI/CGAS 100, 174

IAS-116/74

13 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Product Review
Division, Intelligence Community Staff

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SUBJECT : Comments on PHOTINT

1. Herewith my informal comments on the draft forwarded with Col. Armstrong's memorandum of 30 August 1974.

2. This draft is an improvement over the previous one, but it still misses the mark. It retains misperceptions which can only stem from a superficial investigation of the subject under study and the continued reference to the PHOTINT exploitation community when referring only to NPIC is misleading the reader. I'm disappointed that there still have been no formal interviews with IAS managers or workers--contrary to what might be inferred from paragraph 7--which might have dispelled some of the misperceptions. I am also struck by the presentation of single solutions to the problems raised, with no consideration of feasible alternatives.

3. Most of the problems cited in this paper are unique to NPIC because of the nature of its role and mission, and they are not necessarily shared by other PHOTINT components--certainly not by IAS. These matters pose problems for NPIC, because that component is charged with immediate exploitation of imagery in support of the Intelligence community. NPIC has many customers from various agencies competing for its services, and in crisis situations it may be swamped with conflicting or overlapping requirements. IAS serves only one agency, and in crisis situations receives requirements from only two or three different points within CIA. These requirements and their relative priorities are closely monitored by IAS management, and conflicts resolved through negotiation with requestors.

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4. I concur fully, however, in the concept of having the NIO play a greater role in coordinating and prioritizing requirements for imagery exploitation by NPIC in support of community crisis task force reporting needs. I believe the paper should, however, examine the option of having the NIO do this, through some streamlined variant of the existing USIB directed COMIREX/EXSUBCOM mechanism rather than layering on an NPIC liaison officer. The NIO's can influence requirements levied on the "departmental" PHOTINT components--IAS and DI-8--indirectly as they levy crisis-related tasks on the production components of their parent agencies. As a minimum, paragraph 15 needs reworking to eliminate the confusing misuse of the term "collectors" when exploitation elements presumably are intended.

5. The second major thrust of the paper--integration of crisis-related PHOTINT exploitation resources into a joint effort--can be justified only if all crisis-related production components in the community are similarly integrated. Central to the problem stated in paragraph 18 is that CIA and DIA have separate intelligence production activities, and that, in CIA at least, not all production resources concerned with a crisis area are placed in the current intelligence crisis task force. Most production offices retain some resources to prepare estimative or in-depth analytical studies which complement the work of the task force. The work of these elements will usually be in the purview of the NIO, and is in support of national requirements. Direct PHOTINT support of such studies is the mission of IAS, and the detailed imagery analysis required differs from the quick exploitation of standing requirements performed by NPIC. These functions are best kept separate and distinct, to ensure that each is effectively accomplished without detriment to the other.

6. Another function served by IAS--in the process of assimilating imagery into its files for later use in detailed analysis--is that of providing a "second look" at the film. This "second look" may be redundant, but so is the reading of collateral reports by more than one person in the production offices. That "second look" has often corrected serious errors in initial PHOTINT reports. The arguments presented in paragraphs 19 and 20 imply that the intelligence consumer needs his information "quick" rather than "right"--that accuracy is less important than speed. I would suggest that in the incident cited in paragraph 19--which is not accurately described--the delay was less critical than the difference in numbers. In any event

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the cost of the "second look" can be justified on the basis of the confidence it engenders in the accuracy of analysis ultimately presented to the consumer.

7. Finally, the ambivalence of paragraphs 21 and 22 is not helpful to the reader. The Director of NPIC already has a charter to support the community by immediate exploitation of imagery. In a crisis situation he uses only a fraction of his own resources in this task. He has no responsibility for direct support of departmental needs, and there is no sound justification for diluting his immediate read-out responsibility by giving him that added task in a crisis, in the absence of the total integration of all DIA and CIA crisis-related production activities.




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